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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Plaintiffs/Respondents to recover 
·upon a judgment entered by a court in Maricopa County, Arizona. 
This judgment was entered upon a default which was through no 
fault of Defendants/Appellants but rather because of errors and 
omissions of the attorneys representing Defendants/Appellants in 
the Arizona court. Jurisdiction in Arizona was claimed over the 
Defendants, which are all residents of the state of Utah, through 
the exercise of the so called long-arm doctrine. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was brought before the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for the County of Salt Lake, Judge Bryant E. Croft, 
upon a motion for summary judgment, and summary judgment was 
granted to Plaintiffs/Respondents. 
EXACT RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendants/Appellants respectfully requests the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah to reverse the judgment of the Lower 
1r Court, and to direct said Lower Court that the full faith and 
credit clause of the United States Constitution does not require 
the Utah Courts to enforce the judgment entered in the Arizona 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
This matter was brought before the Arizona Court by 
Plaintiff claiming money damages against Defendants herein. 
Judgment was entered in the Arizona Court by default. The default 
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resulted because of failure of the Arizona attorney, representing 
Defendants herein, to file the answer which had been prepared by 
Defendants and submitted to the Arizona attorney for filing. 
Sometime after that answer had been prepared and a copy sent to 
Defendants in the state of Utah, the Arizona attorney withdrew 
from the case. Defendants subsequently learned that the answer 
prepared had not been filed in the Arizona Court. Other counsel 
was obtained and motion was made to set aside the default. This 
motion was denied. The Court also refused to delay the hearing 
of the motion to allow representatives of Defendants to travel 
to Arizona and to appear before the Court. Defendants were 
delayed in their appearance because of a delay in the airplane 
flight upon which they had been booked. 
The attorney was instructed to appeal to the Arizona 
Supreme Court and indicated that he would. A considerable time 
later Defendants were notified by counsel in Arizona that they 
must provide a Two Hundred and Fifty Dollar ($250.00) bond which 
must be provided within five days. Defendants immediately sub-
mitted the required funds by United States Mail, but delivery of 
the mail was not accomplished within tpe five days time allowed 
by the Arizona attorney, and thus the appeal was never heard. 
The Arizona Court thus claimed jurisdiction over Defendants 
without ever having answered any of the jurisdictional questions 
involved under the long-arm concept. Defendants/Appellants have 
never had an opportunity to present their defenses, have not had 
their day in court, and now Plaintiff and Respondent is attempting 
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to recover by an action in the State of Utah upon the judgment 
rendered by the State of Arizona against Utah Defendants and 
Plaintiffs/Respondents is still attempting to deny to Defendants/ 
Appellants the basic right of due process to have opportunity to 
be heard before the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE INQUIRY BY THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT INTO THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION OF THE ARIZONA COURT 
OVER UTAH CITIZENS~ INDEED, THE JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION MUST 
BE INVESTIGATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
The editors of ALR3d discuss this question in Volume 23, 
page 561 as follows: 
[I]t is important to note the fundamental principles, 
particularly as enunciated by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, as to the extent to which the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affects the power of 
a state to subject nonresident individuals or foreign 
corporations to the inpersonam jurisdiction of the local 
courts. Even if not raised or considered in an individual 
case, these constitutional questions are always lurking 
in the record, particularly in a case in which jurisdiction 
is sustained. . . . While a state may choose not to exercise 
its jurisdiction over nonresidents and foreign corporations 
to the full extent permissible by the due process clause of 
-3-
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the Fourteenth Amendment, it has obviously no power to 
assert inpersonam jurisdiction in violation of that clause. 
The constitutional restriction on jurisdiction of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was loosened and broadened beginning in 
1945 in the leading case of International Shoe Co. v Washington 
(1945) 326 US 310, 90 L Ed 95, 66 S Ct ~54, 161 ALR 1057. The 
editors of 23 ALR3d commented on the International Shoe case at 
page 563 as follows: 
In lieu of the prior tests, a new test was laid down to 
the effect that the due process clause requires only that 
in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personarn, 
certain minimum contacts within the territory of the forum 
must be shown so that the maintenance of the suit does not 
'offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice,' ..• It was also pointed out that an 'estimate 
of the inconvenience' which would result to the foreign 
corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or principal 
place of business is relevant in this connection. 
The editors of 23 ALR3d also refer to another leading United 
States Supreme Court case on page 565. That case is Hanson v 
Denckla (1958) 357 US 235, 251, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 1296, 78 S Ct 
1228 and indicate that in that matter the Court is 
holding that the state trial court lacked in personam 
jurisdiction over defendant foreign trustee, warned that 
it is a mistake to assume that this trend 'heralds the 
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eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal juris-
diction of state courts.' It was pointed out that those 
restrictions are more than a guaranty of immunity from 
inconvenient or distant litigation, but a consequence of 
territorial limitation on the power of the respective 
state. 
Chester J. Antieau, in Volume I of his Modern Constitutional Law 
§7:14, beginning on page 543, states that the right to be heard 
on the merits is basic. 
The United States Supreme Court has referred to 'the 
right to·be heard' as 'one of the most fundamental 
requisites of due process.' Again it has state~, 'a 
fundamental requirem~nt of due process is the opportunity 
to be heard.' 
Antieau cites Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Savings Co. v Hill 
~ (1930) 281 US 673, 74 L Ed 1107, 1112, SO S Ct 451 and capitulates 
the Court's holding as follows: 
When the Missouri Court refused to hear a person on the 
merits of his claim by announcing a new rule that required 
prior recourse to an administrative agency, at a time when 
such appeals had already run, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the Missouri Court had, in so repudiating 
its earlier position, 'denied to the plaintiff due process 
of law--using that term in its primary sense of an 
opportunity to be heard and to defend its substantive right.' 
'It is plain,' observed the Court, 'that the practical effect 
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of the judgment of the Missouri Court is to deprive the 
plaintiff of property without affording it at any time an 
opportunity to be heard in its defense. . . • by denying 
to it the only remedy ever available for the enforcement 
of its right to prevent the seizure of its property, the 
judgment deprives the plaintiff of its property.' 
Antieau also cites Hovey v Elliott (1897) 167 US 409, 42 L Ed 
215, 17 S Ct 841 and capitulates the findings of that Court as 
follows: 
When the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia 
attempted to deprive a defendant of his right to answer a 
suit brought against him, and struck his answer, then 
entered judgment against him, because of his refusal to 
deliver to a court-appointed receiver certain funds which 
were the subject of the litigation, a New York court 
refused to honor the judgment and it was affirmed by the 
United States Supreme Court which ruled that the first 
court had deprived the defendant of his property without 
due process of law by denying him his constitutional right 
to a day in court. 
In 16 Am Jur 2d under Conflict of Laws §13:33 the editors 
state that "the constitutional requirement of full faith and 
credit does not automatically compel a forum state to subordinate 
its own statutory policy to a conflicting public act of another 
state;" and refers to several citations thereunder. 
Public acts can be defined as both statutory or acts of the court. 
-6-
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The Arizona Courts claim to jurisdiction in this matter, 
based as it is on the long-arm statute concept, must uphold those 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice required 
by the United States Supreme Court. It should be obvious that 
these traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice 
are to be applied equally to the in-state Plaintiff and the 
out-of-state Defendant. Absent equal application of those 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, the 
out-of-state Defendant is now just as much at the mercy of the 
in-state Plaintiff as formerly the in-state Plaintiff was at the 
mercy of the out-of-state Defendant. Traditional notio~s of fair 
play and substantial justice require that the Utah Supreme Court 
deny the claim of jurisdiction of Arizona through the long-arm 
statute concept over Utah citizens, and should deny the Arizona 
Plaintiff the judgment sought. 
POINT II: THE INDIVIDUAL MALE DEFENDANTS WERE ACTING ONLY AS 
CORPORATE OFFICERS, AND NOT AS INDIVIDUALS, AND EVEN IF 
JURISDICTION OVER THE CORPORATION WERE ALLOWED OR HELD TO BE 
PROPERr JURISDICTION OVER THE INDIVIDUAL MALE DEFENDA.~TS SHOULD 
NOT BE ALLOWED. 
The Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B, 
:·:· in Magidow v Coronado Cattle Company, 19 Ariz. App. 38, 504 P2d 
.... 
961 (1972) considered very similar facts to those in the present 
;t 
case. The Court cited Hanson v Denckla, previously cited in this 
brief, with approval indicating that there are still restrictions 
~~ 
on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. They also cite 
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International Shoe Co. v Washington, also previously cited in this 
brief, as authority for the rule that the United States Constitution 
does not allow a state to make binding judgment in personam 
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state 
has no contacts, ties, or relations. And that in order to 
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam he must have certain 
minimum contacts such tnat the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
The Court then indicates that the only exception to this general 
rule which might be applicable to the case is found in Rule 4(e) 
(2}, Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., which provides in 
part: "When the defendant • • • is a person . . • which has 
caused an event to occur in this state out of which the claim 
which is the subject of the complaint arose .•• " he may be 
served personally without the state with the same effect as if 
served within it. This Rule is intended to give Arizona courts 
the maximum jurisdiction permitted under the minimum contacts 
doctrine of the International Shoe case. The Court held, 
Reviewing the facts of the present action, it.is 
apparent that neither of the Magidows had any contacts, 
minimum or otherwise, with Arizona in connection with 
the subject of the complaint. The contract on which 
respondent is suing was between itself and Hi-Pro, a 
corporation. The order for shipment of the cattle which 
gave rise to this contract was placed by that corporation 
through one of its agents. • It thus appears that 
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Eloise Maqidow had no contacts with respondent of Arizona 
whatsoever other than those arising from her membership in 
the marital community with Aaron Magidow; that Aaron 
Maqidow had no such contacts except in his capacity as 
president of Hi-Pro; and that there is thus no basis for 
imposing personal liability or personal jurisdiction on 
either of them by virtue of personal service of the sununons 
outside of the State of Arizona. Respondent has failed to 
meet its burden of establishing jurisdiction, which is 
imposed on it when jurisdiction is challenged. 
In this matter, as in the case cited above, there has been 
no showing that the individual male defendants were other than 
corporate officers nor that they acted in a manner inconsistent 
with their corporate agency and there has been no showing of any 
'I t. unity of interest between the individual male defendants and the 
ni corporate defendant such that it can be said that the separate 
personalities of each cease to exist. The claim of jurisdiction 
of the Arizona Court over the individual male defendants herein 
therefore cannot be sustained and should not be enforced by this 
court. 
POINT III: THE INDIVIDUAL FEMALE DEFENDANTS HAD NO CONTACT WITH 
ARIZONA, WERE NOT CORPORATE OFFICERS, AND JURISDICTION OVER 
THEM CANNOT BE CONFERRED BY THE LONG-ARM CONCEPT. 
In Ma9idow v Coronado Cattle Co. cited in the previous 
point the Arizona Court of Appeals disposed of the idea that 
-9-
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jurisdiction over the wife of one of the corporate officers 
could be obtained under the long-arm concept. The Court of Appeals 
of Arizona held in that matter, "It thus appears that Eloise 
Magidow had no contacts with respondent or Arizona whatsoever 
other than those arising from her membership in the marital 
community with Aaron Magidow; • • • Respondent has failed to 
meet its burden of establishing jurisdiction, which is imposed 
on it when jurisdiction is challenged." 
POINT IV: THE DEFENDANTS WERE PRECLUDED FROM DEFENDING THEMSELVES 
IN ARIZONA BY THE ERRORS AND OMISSIONS OF ARIZONA COUNSEL FOR 
DEFENDANTS AND BY THE ACTIONS OF ARIZONA COURT IN FAILING TO 
GIVE ALLOWANCE FOR THE INCONVENIENCE OF TRIAL AWAY FROM THE 
.DEFENDANTS' HOME OR PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS. 
The International Shoe case previously cited held that 
in addition to the certain minimum contacts that the Court must 
also make an estimate of the inconvenience which would result to 
the foreign corporation of a trial away from its home or principal 
place of business. In this matter the Arizona Court completely 
failed to give any relevance or weight to that requirement. 
Before jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court all of the 
constitutional requirements of that jurisdiction must be met. In 
this matter the Arizona Court has failed to give any consideration 
at all to those inconveniences. Because of those inconveniences 
the Defendants have been unable to comply with the rules of 
procedure of the Arizona Court, and the Arizona Court thus entered 
-10-
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a default against them and refused to set aside the default 
Jcnowing full well the particulars of the matter and that the 
failure to answer was not due to fault on the part of the 
Defendants but rather to an error and omission on the part of 
counsel retained by Defendants. The default judgment is a severe 
and drastic measure and should not be taken unless it is clear 
that the Defendant has willfully failed to avail himself of the 
opportunities to present his defenses. In this matter the Court 
might well take judicial notice of the tendency of Utah Courts 
to set aside defaults for any showing of an excusable neglect 
on the part of Defendants' attorney. And certainly the courts 
of Utah are not inclined to punish Defendants for the failure 
of Defendants' attorney where Defendants themselves are not at 
fault. In this matter the errors and omissions of the Arizona 
attorneys, which may well be a result of the difficulties of 
communication through the mail and by telephone and lacking face-to-
face conferences and cooperative efforts on the part of Defendants 
and counsel, gave the Arizona Court the legal justification to 
enter the default of Defendants and to fail to set aside the 
default. It is also the reason that the Court of Appeals of 
Arizona did not hear this matter. Where Defendants have been 
denied due process by being denied the opportunity to be heard 
in court because of the failure of the Arizona Court to give 
relevance to the inconveniences experienced by the out-of-state 
Defendants the Court has deprived itself of jurisdiction if it 
could have sustained it on any other grounds. Let us note again 
-11-
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that jurisdiction in this matter could only be found in the Arizona 
Court upon the exception to the general rule denying it jurisdic-
tion which is available through the long-arm statute concept. 
Thus, by failing to meet all the requirements set up by the United 
States Supreme Court in the International Shoe case the Arizona 
Court has failed to meet the requirements of the exception, thus 
falls under the general rule and is denied any jurisdiction over 
Defendants in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Supreme Court is not required to give automatic 
approval of foreign court actions under the full faith and credit 
clause. Indeed, under the traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice Utah Supreme Court must inquire into the 
jurisdictional questions presented here in order to prevent an 
unconscionable miscarriage of justice. 
The Court of Appeals of Arizona acting in similar fact 
situations have denied the extension of jurisdiction to corporate 
officers and to wives of corporate officers. The Defendants 
herein have been denied due process of law which is required by 
the United States constitution and the Utah constitution. De-
fendants herein are entitled to have their day in court to 
satisfy due process of law and to be protected from the actions 
of the foreign court in claiming jurisdiction over them contrary 
to the constitutional requirements established to govern such 
matters. 
-12-
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Justice will best be served by reversing the decision of 
the Lower Court and by dismissing the complaint of Plaintiff/ 
Respondent in this matter. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
C. GEf~ ROBERTSON 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
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